

10 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Houston

SUBJECT : The Lindsay Article in the
March 1964 Esquire

1. The first full paragraph of the second column of Mr. Lindsay's article purports to be a quotation from my Strategic Intelligence (Princeton, 1949). It consists of three sentences. This passage has a history which Mr. Lindsay might be interested in.

2. When Fred J. Cook's article, "The C.I.A.," appeared as a special issue of The Nation (N.Y., 24 June 1961), it carried these three sentences as they appear in the Lindsay article but with one small and highly important variation. Between the second and third sentences, Mr. Cook inserted the printer's device -- three dots -- to indicate an ellipsis. What these three dots stood for was about a page and a half of text, and thus it should not be surprising to realize that the final sentence of the Cook borrowing referred to something quite different from that introduced by the first two sentences of his quotation. In other words, Mr. Cook almost made me say something which I did not say at all. The qualifier "almost" is used in deference to Mr. Cook's use of the three dots. Anyone wondering whether or not I had so written was put on warning that he should go to my book and see for himself.

3. A few years later (1962) Andrew Tully's CIA -- The Inside Story appeared. As should be well known, Mr. Tully's work is very largely a shameless compilation of unattributed borrowings, including Fred G. Cook. On page 54, he seems to have repeated the Cook rendering of my thoughts, but omits the three dots between the second and third sentences. The reader now has no indication whatever of an ellipsis and is quite free to misconstrue my thought.

4. I have wondered why Mr. Lindsay took the Tully rendering. You might inquire. Incidentally, if he were to read the relevant pages of my book, say 197-201, or even the

whole of Chapter 11 in which these pages occur, he might be interested. He might perceive, for example, that the matter which was bugging me in these pages was the matter of administratively subordinating intelligence components to their policy opposites. For example, in the State Department in 1946, the intelligence organization by order of the Secretary was fragmented into its regional and functional units and each of these put under the direct supervision of the appropriate policy office of the Department, e.g., the Latin American intelligence division put under the Bureau of American Republics Affairs, etc.

5. I suppose the same sort of administrative juggling could have been done in any of the military intelligence services simply by subordinating the G-2 to the G-3 and then each of the G-2 sub-components to its operational equivalent in G-3. CIA had not been born when I began my book and when I finished it the Agency's operational components were still all but non-existent. However, to carry the analogy over to CIA would mean that the many research and analytical functions being performed by that part of the CIA now known as the Deputy Directorate of Intelligence would have similarly been fragmented along regional and functional lines and parcelled out to the corresponding clandestine operational components.

6. This kind of thing was of course not remotely an issue when I wrote the book, nor has it ever become an issue since. Writers like Mr. Lindsay -- and there have been a good number -- who are fearful of the consequences of a confusion between the Agency's intelligence -- including estimating -- functions and its operational functions should realize that precisely the same separation obtains in the Agency, that has obtained for ever in the military services and since General Marshall's Secretaryship in the Department of State.

SHERMAN KENT